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For almost a century now, conditioning research has provided important insights in the 
etiology and treatment of anxiety disorders. Nevertheless, doubts were raised about whether 
anxiety disorders are related to conditioning. In this paper, I focus on distinguishing different 
claims about the relation between anxiety disorders and conditioning as well as ways of 
evaluating the merits of these claims. More specifically, a distinction is made between the 
claim that anxiety disorders are conditioning effects and the claim that anxiety disorders are 
due to a specific type of conditioning mechanism (i.e., the formation and activation of S-R 
associations, S-S associations, or propositions). Based on a brief review of the literature, I 
clarify which pieces of evidence are relevant for which claims and illustrate that different 
claims are differentially supported by the available evidence. Finally, I discuss two strategic 
reasons for conceptualizing anxiety disorders as conditioning effects rather than as effects of 
a particular conditioning mechanism.  
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Revisiting classical conditioning as a model for anxiety disorders: 
A conceptual analysis and brief review 
 Ever since the infamous “little Albert” study of Watson and Rayner (1920), research 
on classical conditioning has been regarded as a major source of information about the 
etiology and treatment of anxiety disorders in psychotherapy. Highly effective treatment 
strategies such as exposure and systematic desensitization were derived directly from insights 
obtained in classical conditioning research (Eelen & Vervliet, 2006). More generally, 
behavior therapy was conceived of as the application of conditioning principles in the 
treatment of psychopathology (Wolpe & Lazarus, 1966). 
Although conditioning research continued to provide ideas on how to improve the 
psychotherapy of anxiety disorders (see Craske, Hermans, & Vervliet, 2018, for a recent 
review), doubts have been voiced about the core assumption of the conditioning approach to 
anxiety disorders, namely the idea that anxiety disorders are actually related to conditioning. 
In a seminal publication, Rachman (1977) provided several arguments against this idea. 
Likewise, Poulton and Menzies (2002) reviewed evidence which suggests that (some) anxiety 
disorders are due to genetic factors rather than to conditioning. 
Given the historical importance of the conditioning approach to anxiety disorders, it is 
not surprising that critical analyses such as those of Rachman (1977) and Poulton and 
Menzies (2002) evoked quite some debate. In the context of this debate, a number of highly 
visible papers were published that defended the merits of conditioning research for 
understanding the etiology and treatment of anxiety disorders (e.g., Field, 2006; Mineka & 
Zinbarg, 2006). The current paper aims to contribute to this debate by distinguishing different 
claims about the nature of the relation between anxiety disorders and classical conditioning. 
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The fact that there is merit in distinguishing these claims is made apparent on the basis of (1) 
a brief review of the relevant literature which reveals that different claims are not supported 
to the same extent and (2) a discussion of strategic reasons for preferring certain claims over 
others. 1   
In the first part of the paper, I start by pointing out that conditioning can be defined 
either as an effect (i.e., a change in behavior that is due to the pairing of stimuli) or as a 
mediating mechanism (e.g., the formation of associations in memory). Hence, the claim that 
anxiety disorders are instances of conditioning could imply either that they are instances of 
conditioning effects or that they are due to a specific conditioning mechanism (i.e., the 
formation of S-R associations, S-S associations, and/or propositions). I then discuss the way 
in which these different claims can be evaluated. In the second part of the paper, I briefly 
review evidence that is relevant for evaluating these different claims. Although this evidence 
has been reviewed elsewhere in a much more comprehensive manner (e.g., Craske, Hermans, 
& Vansteenwegen, 2006; Craske et al., 2018; Field, 2006; Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006; Poulton 
& Menzies, 2002), the main contribution of the current review is that it evaluates the 
evidence for each individual claim separately, thereby revealing that evidence against one 
claim is not necessarily evidence against another claim or against the clinical relevance of 
conditioning research in general. The third and final section presents two strategic arguments 
for conceptualizing anxiety disorders as conditioning effects rather than as effects of a 
particular conditioning mechanism and thus further highlights the importance of 
distinguishing between these different claims. 
                                                 
1 
The focus will be on classical conditioning because anxiety disorders are typically linked with this type of 
conditioning rather than with operant conditioning. In the present paper, I will thus often use the term 
“conditioning” as shorthand for “classical conditioning”. 




 Any debate about the relation between classical conditioning and anxiety disorders 
necessarily depends on one’s conception of the terms “classical conditioning” and “anxiety 
disorders”. Although there are many different anxiety disorders that might be related in 
different ways to conditioning (e.g., Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006), for reasons of simplicity, I do 
not differentiate between the different disorders, nor do I commit myself to specific criteria 
that can be used to delineate anxiety disorders from other disorders or non-pathological 
conditions. Remaining silent about these issues allows me to focus on an analysis of the 
concept “classical conditioning” and the implications of this analysis.  
Two Ways of Thinking about Classical Conditioning 
Classical conditioning as an effect. When conceptualized as an effect, classical 
conditioning corresponds to a change in behavior that is due to the prior pairing of stimuli 
(Bolles, 1979; De Houwer, 2007; Eelen, 2018; Rescorla, 1988). For example, an increase in 
the skin conductance level that is evoked by a tone (conditional stimulus; CS) qualifies as an 
instance of classical conditioning if the increase is caused by the pairing of the tone with an 
aversive electric shock (unconditional stimulus; US). As such, labeling a certain change in 
behavior as an instance of classical conditioning involves a hypothetical causal attribution, 
more precisely, the causal claim that the change is due to the pairing of stimuli rather than 
other elements in the environment (e.g., the mere repeated presentation of a US; De Houwer, 
Barnes-Holmes, & Moors, 2013; De Houwer & Hughes, in press). 
Multiple stimulus pairings can also jointly influence behavior. For instance, studies on 
sensory pre-conditioning revealed that animals fear an originally neutral CS1 after it has been 
paired with another neutral CS2, provided that CS2 is afterwards paired with an aversive US 
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(i.e., CS1-CS2 pairings followed by CS2-US pairings; see Brogden, 1939). In this case, CS1 
and the aversive US have never co-occurred but they did both co-occur with a third stimulus 
(CS2). The change in responding to CS1 is the joint effect of the CS1-CS2 pairings and the 
subsequent CS2-US pairings (i.e., neither pairings alone would produce the change in 
behavior). Such joint effects of different stimulus pairings are typically also regarded as 
classical conditioning effects (but see De Houwer & Hughes, in press, Chapter 4). 
It is less clear whether changes in behavior that result from conditioning instructions 
(i.e., instructions about stimulus pairings) can also be considered as instances of conditioning 
effects. Some have argued that conditioning instruction involve the spatio-temporal pairing of 
words (e.g., the words “tone” and “shock”) which might as such be the cause of changes in 
behavior (e.g., Field, 2006). However, it seems more likely that the effects of conditioning 
instructions are due to the symbolic meaning of the instruction as a whole rather than the 
mere spatio-temporal co-occurrence of words. For instance, it is likely that the sentence “tone 
will be followed by shock” causes more fear for the tone than the sentence “tone will not be 
followed by shock” even though both sentences involve a spatio-temporal pairing of the 
words “tone” and “shock”. Regardless of whether effects of conditioning instructions qualify 
as instances of conditioning, research on the effects of conditioning instructions can be 
considered as an integral part of conditioning research because the instructions focus on the 
event that is studied in conditioning research: stimulus pairings (see De Houwer & Hughes, 
2016, for an in depth discussion).  
Classical conditioning as a mechanism. When conceived of as a mechanism, 
classical conditioning refers to a chain of processing steps via which stimulus pairings 
influence behavior. Hence, conditioning mechanisms provide a potential explanation of 
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conditioning effects (see De Houwer et al., 2013, and De Houwer & Hughes, in press, for in 
depth discussions). For instance, it is often assumed that the repeated co-occurrence of a CS 
and US results in the gradual formation of an association between the representation of the 
CS and the representation of the US in memory. Once this association has been formed, the 
presentation of the CS can result in the activation of the US representation, which results in 
changes in behavior (see Bouton, 2016, for a review of the various association formation 
models, and Haselgrove, 2016, for a discussion of their core assumptions). However, it has 
also been argued that conditioning effects are mediated by a mechanism that produces and 
deploys propositional beliefs (e.g., De Houwer, 2009, 2018; Mitchell, De Houwer, & 
Lovibond, 2009; see below for more information about propositional models of 
conditioning). More generally, different potential conditioning mechanisms differ with regard 
to assumptions about the nature of the representations that mediate conditioning effects (Step 
2 in Figure 1), the conditions under which stimulus pairings result in the formation of those 
representations (Step 1 in Figure 1), and the conditions under which the activation of 
representations results in changes in behavior (Step 3 in Figure 1; see De Houwer & Hughes, 
in press, for more details). Because it is in principle possible that conditioning effects are 
produced by different mechanisms, one cannot simply equate conditioning as an effect with 
conditioning as a particular mechanism (also see De Houwer, 2020). 2 
 
----- Insert Figure 1 About Here ----- 
 
                                                 
2 For brevity and simplicity, we discuss only cognitive theories of conditioning mechanisms, that is, theories 
which focus on mental representations and mental processes as the components of mechanisms. One could also 
conceive of conditioning mechanisms at other levels of explanation, such as neurological or biochemical 
mechanisms.   
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How to Determine Whether Anxiety Disorders are Instances of Classical Conditioning?  
 Anxiety disorders as instances of classical conditioning effects. The claim that 
anxiety disorders are instances of classical conditioning effects implies the hypothesis that 
those disorders result from the pairing of certain stimuli in the past environment of that 
individual. For instance, arguing that a patient’s fear for spiders is a classical conditioning 
effect boils down to the hypothesis that the fear originated from past events in which the 
individual saw a spider that co-occurred with other events such as a painful bite from a 
spider. If it turns out that the fear for spiders was not caused by stimulus pairings, it would 
not qualify as an instance of classical conditioning. In principle, anxiety disorders could arise 
also from other aspects of the environment such as genetic factors (as shaped by the ancestral 
environment; e.g., an inborn fear of heights, see Poulton & Menzies, 2002) or the mere 
repeated presence of a stimulus (e.g., sensitization effects such as the escalation of a mild fear 
for snakes into a phobia for snakes after being confronted with many snakes in a short period 
of time).  
In the laboratory, researchers can implement control conditions for verifying the 
environmental cause of a certain change in behavior. For instance, when examining the 
impact of tone-shock pairings on fear responses that are evoked by the tone, researchers can 
add a control condition in which the tone and shock are presented equally often but in an 
unpaired manner (e.g., Rescorla, 1966). If the tone evokes more fear after the presentation of 
tone-shock pairings than after the unpaired presentation of tone and shock, one can infer that 
the change in fear for the tone was caused by the pairings of the tone and the shock rather 
than the mere repeated presentation of the tone or shock. In clinical practice, on the other 
hand, the anxiety disorder is already present at the time that the therapist meets the patient for 
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the first time. The therapist therefore cannot directly observe nor control for aspects of the 
past environment of the patient that might have caused the anxiety disorder. This seriously 
complicates the debate about whether anxiety disorders are instances of classical conditioning 
as an effect. 
Although it is nearly impossible to determine with certainty that the anxiety disorder 
displayed by an individual patient is an instance of classical conditioning as an effect, it is 
possible to evaluate the general idea that anxiety disorders are instances of conditioning 
effects. A first aspect of this evaluation is to examine whether stimulus pairings are a possible 
cause of anxiety disorders (i.e., anxiety disorders can be due to stimulus pairings). Rather 
than trying to show that each individual anxiety disorder is due to stimulus pairings, the aim 
is to identify at least some instances in which stimulus pairings appear to be the cause of an 
anxiety disorder or behavior akin to that seen in anxiety disorders. If such instances cannot be 
identified, there is little merit in believing that stimulus pairings are a common source of 
anxiety disorders.  
A second aspect of the evaluation of the merits of the conditioning approach to 
anxiety disorders is to assess whether stimulus pairings are a necessary cause of anxiety 
disorders (i.e., anxiety disorders can only be due to stimulus pairings). Proving that stimulus 
pairings are necessary is difficult to achieve because it involves a claim about all possible 
instances of anxiety disorders in the past, present, and future. It is possible, however, to 
disprove the hypothesis that stimulus pairings are a necessary cause of anxiety disorders. This 
involves the identification of individual instances of anxiety disorders that are not caused by 
stimulus pairings. If most instances of anxiety disorder appear to be due to factors other than 
the pairing of stimuli, it would reduce the relevance of conditioning research for clinical 
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practice.  Note, however, that the mere demonstration of the existence of other causes of 
anxiety disorders as such does not imply that stimulus pairings are not also an important 
cause of anxiety disorders.  
The third aspect of testing the merits of the conditioning approach is to examine the 
extent to which stimulus pairings are a sufficient cause of anxiety disorders (i.e., stimulus 
pairings always cause anxiety disorders). Again it is difficult to prove that stimulus pairings 
are sufficient but possible to prove that they are not sufficient. The latter involves the search 
for cases in which anxiety disorders (e.g., excessive fear of spiders) are absent despite the 
presence of stimulus pairings (e.g., having experienced a painful biter from a spider). 
However, in itself, showing that these instances exist, says little about the merits of the 
conditioning approach. Even when stimulus pairings are not sufficient to cause the onset of 
anxiety disorders, they might still be responsible for anxiety disorders when these disorders 
do occur. Moreover, all causes are insufficient in that their effect depends on the presence of 
certain enabling conditions and can be moderated by variables in the environment (Mackie, 
1965). This reduces the value of showing that a particular cause (e.g., stimulus pairings) is 
not a sufficient cause of a particular phenomenon (e.g., anxiety disorders).  
It is, however, important to examine the precise way in which stimulus pairings are 
insufficient causes of changes in behavior. Such research reveals the moderators of classical 
conditioning effects. If anxiety disorders are instances of classical conditioning effects, they 
should be functionally equivalent to conditioning effects, that is, they should be moderated by 
the same environmental variables as conditioning effects. Entertaining the hypothesis that 
anxiety disorders are instances of conditioning effects has merit only if there are important 
parallels between the moderators of both phenomena. If there is substantial overlap between 
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the moderators of anxiety disorders (e.g., the conditions under which exposure therapy 
reduces anxiety) and the moderators of (certain types of) classical conditioning effects in the 
laboratory (e.g., the conditions under which extinction procedures reduces conditioned fear), 
it becomes useful to use the latter as a model of the former. If anxiety disorders and 
conditioning effects are functional equivalent (i.e., influenced in the same way by potential 
moderators) then more can be learned about the moderators of anxiety disorders by studying 
the moderators of classical conditioning effects in the laboratory. This brings us to one of the 
main points of this paper: The merits of the idea that anxiety disorders are conditioning 
effects can be evaluated by examining the match between the moderators of classical 
conditioning effects that are observed in the laboratory and the moderators of anxiety 
disorders.   
 Anxiety disorders as caused by classical conditioning mechanisms. One could also 
claim that anxiety disorders are due to the operation of a particular conditioning mechanism 
(e.g., the formation and activation of CS-US associations in memory). It is important to 
realize that such a claim implies that anxiety disorders are instances of conditioning effects. 
Without reasons for arguing that anxiety disorders are due to the pairings of stimuli, it does 
not make sense to examine claims about the mechanism via which stimulus pairings result in 
anxiety disorders. Verifying the role of conditioning mechanisms in anxiety disorders 
therefore requires verification of the assumption that anxiety disorders are instances of 
conditioning effects. On top of that, one also has to determine the specific mechanism via 
which stimulus pairings have this effect. Because there are multiple mechanisms via which 
stimulus pairings can cause changes in behavior, it is risky to infer the operation of a specific 
mechanism simply on the basis of establishing conditioning as an effect. 
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 So how can one determine whether anxiety disorders are due to a specific 
conditioning mechanism? Because of their informational nature, neither mental 
representations such as associations or propositional beliefs, nor the processes via which such 
representations are formed and activated, are directly observable by an outside researcher 
(Neisser, 1967). However, theories about conditioning mechanisms can be evaluated on the 
basis of their heuristic and predictive value (De Houwer, 2011). Good conditioning theories 
are able to explain existing findings about the conditions under which conditioning effects 
occur (i.e., heuristic value) and to successfully predict new findings (i.e., predictive value). 
Research about the moderators of conditioning effects thus provides the input for the 
construction and evaluation of theories about conditioning mechanisms (see De Houwer & 
Hughes, in press). 
Hence, the question of whether anxiety disorders are mediated by a specific 
conditioning mechanism should be examined by gathering information about the moderators 
of anxiety disorders. The idea that anxiety disorders are due to a specific conditioning 
mechanism has merit only if it allows one to account for the known moderators of anxiety 
disorders (heuristic function) and to predict new moderators (predictive function). Moreover, 
because each conditioning theory makes different predictions, each theory needs to be 
evaluated separately. Evidence against the involvement of one particular conditioning 
mechanism does not allow one to exclude the involvement of other conditioning mechanisms. 
3  
                                                 
3 Our proposal for evaluating the merits of conditioning research bears some resemblance to the criteria of 
predictive validity and construct validity as proposed by Vervliet and Raes (2013). Predictive validity can be 
seen as referring to the match between the moderators of conditioning effects and the moderators of anxiety 
disorders. Construct validity refers to a match between the causal factors operating in conditioning effects and 
those operation in anxiety disorders. However, Vervliet and Raes do not distinguish between conditioning as an 
effect and conditioning as a mechanism. Hence, it is unclear whether their criteria refer to conditioning effects 
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A Brief Review of the Relevant Literature 
 In this second section, I briefly review the available evidence regarding the different 
claims that can be made about the role of conditioning in anxiety disorders. I first discuss 
evidence that is relevant for deciding whether anxiety disorders are conditioning effects. 
Afterwards, I review evidence that is relevant for the claim that anxiety disorders are due to 
specific conditioning mechanisms. As noted above, the literature review is not meant to be 
comprehensive, nor to provide the final word on the merit of the different claims (for more 
comprehensive reviews, see Craske et al., 2006, 2018; Field, 2006; Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006; 
Poulton & Menzies, 2002). Instead, the review primarily aims to clarify what type of evidence 
is relevant for the different claims that can be made. By evaluating each claim separately, it 
also becomes clear that different claims are supported to a different extent, which in turn 
illustrates the merits of separating the different claims. 
Are Anxiety Disorders Instances of Classical Conditioning Effects? 
As argued above, in order to evaluate the claim that anxiety disorders are instances of 
conditioning effects, one needs to look for evidence that provides information about whether 
stimulus pairings are a possible, necessary, and sufficient cause of anxiety disorders. Each of 
these questions will be examined separately in this section. A structured overview of the 
evidence can be found in Table 1. 
 Are stimulus pairings a possible cause of anxiety disorders? There is strong 
evidence to support the conclusion that stimulus pairings can cause anxiety disorders. The 
most convincing evidence comes from experimental studies in which stimulus pairings were 
                                                                                                                                                        
(i.e., pairings as causes of conditioned fear and anxiety) or conditioning mechanisms (e.g., association formation 
as the mechanism via stimulus pairings produce conditioned fear and anxiety). Also note that their criterion of 
face validity does not refer to causes, neither in terms of stimulus pairings, nor in terms of mental mechanisms, 
but only to the topographical nature of changes in behavior.  
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actually manipulated. The “little Albert” study of Watson and Rayner (1920) was vital in 
convincing researchers that the pairing of a CS (e.g., a rabbit) with an aversive US (e.g., a 
loud noise) can cause fear responses to CS similar to those seen in anxiety disorders. Because 
of ethical reasons, few subsequent studies have tried to induce anxiety disorders in humans by 
pairing stimuli (see Field & Nightingale, 2009, for a review). Other research in humans and 
non-human animals, however, clearly shows that the pairing of stimuli can lead to behaviors 
very similar to those that form the core of a variety of anxiety disorders (e.g., Delgado, 
Olsson, & Phelps, 2006). Evidence for the causal impact of stimulus pairings on anxiety 
disorders was also obtained in naturalistic and retrospective studies (e.g., Yule, Udwin, & 
Murdoch, 1990; see Field, 2006, for a review).  
 Are stimulus pairings a necessary cause of anxiety disorders? The claim that 
stimulus pairings are a necessary cause of anxiety disorders can be evaluated by looking for 
instances of anxiety disorders that are not due to stimulus pairings (even when the actual 
cause is not clear) and by identifying anxiety disorders that are due to environmental causes 
other than stimulus pairings. Poulton and Menzies (2002; also see Rachman, 1977) reviewed 
a large number of retrospective and longitudinal studies suggesting that anxiety disorders can 
develop in the absence of any aversive stimulus pairings, that is, pairings involving aversive 
stimuli and the stimuli that now evoke fear or anxiety. They also identify three alternatives 
routes by which anxiety disorders could develop in the absence of aversive stimulus pairings 
(i.e., evolution, observation, and verbal messages; see Smoller, Block, & Young, 2009; 
Askew & Field, 2008; Mertens, Boddez, Sevenster, Engelhard, & De Houwer, 2018, and 
Muris & Field, 2010, for reviews of the relevant literature). 
 The relevance of this evidence, however, depends somewhat on the way in which 
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conditioning effects are defined. As we noted above, some researchers entertain a broad 
definition of conditioning effects that includes changes resulting from multiple stimulus 
pairings, verbal instructions about stimulus pairings, or the observation of fearful responses in 
others (e.g., Field, 2006; but see De Houwer & Hughes, in press, Chapter 4). Hence, although 
stimulus pairings in narrow sense (i.e., the actual co-occurrence of a neutral and aversive 
stimulus) are almost certainly not a necessary cause or the only possible cause of anxiety 
disorders, one could still argue that stimulus pairings in a broad sense (i.e., including multiple 
stimulus pairings, verbal instructions, or the observation of others) is a significant source of 
anxiety disorders. This conclusion, however, depends on one’s definition of conditioning as 
an effect. 
Are stimulus pairings a sufficient cause of anxiety disorders? The available 
evidence clearly shows that the co-occurrence of a neutral stimulus with an aversive event is 
not sufficient to cause an anxiety disorder (e.g., Rachman, 1977). As became clear from the 
conceptual analysis, however, it is more important to examine whether stimulus pairings are 
in the same way insufficient as causes of anxiety disorders as they are insufficient as causes 
of classical conditioning effects. In other words, it is important to examine whether anxiety 
disorders and classical conditioning effects are moderated in the same way by variables in the 
environment. Two questions can be examined. (1) Does knowledge about the variables that 
moderate conditioning effects shed light on the conditions under which anxiety disorders 
develop? (2) Do variables that moderate the disappearance of conditioning effects inform us 
about how anxiety disorders can be treated? For therapists, the second question is the most 
crucial one.  
Much of the debate about the merits of the conditioning approach to anxiety disorders 
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can be conceptualized as a discussion about the conditions under which pairings of a neutral 
stimulus and an aversive event result in the development of an anxiety disorder. Before the 
1960’s, some researchers had suggested that aversive stimulus pairings might be a sufficient 
condition for the development of anxiety disorders (e.g., Rachman, 1977). When it became 
apparent that aversive stimulus pairings are, at least in many cases, not a sufficient cause of 
anxiety disorders, one possible conclusion was that classical conditioning and anxiety 
disorders are not functionally equivalent and thus that the conditioning approach to anxiety 
disorders has little merit. However, the accuracy of conclusions about the functional 
equivalence of anxiety disorders and conditioning effects is limited by the accuracy of our 
knowledge of the functional properties of conditioning effects. The assumption that stimulus 
pairings are a sufficient cause of changes in behavior was simply incorrect (e.g., Davey, 1997; 
Field, 2006; Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006). To give just one example, research has shown that the 
effect of pairing a CS with a US can be reduced or even prevented by repeatedly presenting 
the CS on its own before the CS-US pairings (i.e., CS pre-exposure effects; see Lubow, 1995, 
for a review). Hence, the fact that aversive stimulus pairings are not always a sufficient cause 
of anxiety disorders does not disprove the functional equivalence of anxiety disorders and 
conditioning and does not threaten the conditioning approach to anxiety disorders. 
Over the past forty years, conditioning research has uncovered many moderators of 
the effect of stimulus pairings on behavior (for reviews, see Bouton, 2016; De Houwer & 
Hughes, in press; & Field, 2006). Interestingly, knowledge about these moderators provided 
new insights in the development of anxiety disorders by revealing possible reasons for the 
large variability in the development of anxiety disorders (also see Field, 2006; Mineka & 
Zinbarg, 2006). For instance, individuals who experience a particular aversive event (e.g., 
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pain while being treated by a dentist) are less likely to develop anxiety for stimuli related to 
this event (e.g., the dentist) if they have prior experience with the stimuli involved in the 
aversive event (e.g., visits to the dentist prior to the painful treatment; see Kent, 1997; Surwit, 
1972). This observation is in line with the phenomenon of CS pre-exposure effects in 
conditioning research. More generally, there appear to be parallels between the conditions 
under which classical conditioning effects occur and the conditions under which anxiety 
disorders develop. This important observation suggests that both phenomena are at least to 
some extent functionally equivalent and that it is therefore useful to consider anxiety 
disorders as instances of conditioning effects. 
Research on the moderators of classical conditioning not only helps us understand the 
development of anxiety disorders but also sheds light on the treatment of anxiety disorders. It 
has long been known that presenting a CS (e.g., a tone) on its own after the CS-US pairings 
(e.g., tone-shock) reduces the effect that the CS-US pairings have on behavior (e.g., reduction 
in fear for the tone). This moderating effect is known as extinction (e.g., Bouton, 1993). The 
fact that anxiety disorders can be treated by presenting feared objects on their own (as is done 
in exposure treatment; e.g., exposure to a spider), suggests that classical conditioning and 
anxiety disorders are to some extent functionally equivalent. There are many other parallels 
between the conditions under which extinction occurs in classical conditioning research and 
the conditions under which treatment of anxiety disorders is successful. For instance, both 
extinction and exposure treatment effects are highly context dependent and dissipate quickly 
(see Bouton, 1993, and Craske et al., 2006, 2018, for reviews). Given the success of earlier 
generalizations from extinction research to the treatment of anxiety disorders, there is hope 
that this research will help clinicians to further improve their therapies (e.g., Craske et al., 




To summarize, stimulus pairings are certainly not always a sufficient cause of anxiety 
disorders. However, this conclusion does not undermine the conditioning approach to anxiety 
disorders. Conditioning research has shown that also in the laboratory, stimulus pairings do 
not always lead to changes in behavior. More importantly, there are some parallels between 
the conditions under which conditioning effects occur in the laboratory and the conditions 
under which anxiety disorders develop in real life. Likewise, variables that moderate the 
reduction of conditioned changes in behavior also seem to moderate treatment of anxiety 
disorders. To the extent that classical conditioning and anxiety disorders are indeed 
functionally equivalent, there is merit in thinking of anxiety disorders as instances of 
conditioning effects.  
Are Anxiety Disorders Due to a Specific Conditioning Mechanism? 
If stimulus pairings are a significant source of anxiety disorders, then it makes sense 
to examine the conditioning mechanism via which stimulus pairings produce anxiety. For 
each specific conditioning mechanism, it needs to be examined whether it is compatible with 
the fact that stimulus pairings are a possible but not a necessary or sufficient cause of anxiety 
disorders. In the present section, I briefly discuss three possible conditioning mechanisms: the 
formation and activation of S-R associations, S-S associations, and propositions. I also 
consider the idea that multiple mechanisms might be responsible for specific instances of 
anxiety disorders. An overview of the conclusions can again be found in Table 1. 
 S-R association models. According to S-R association models, stimuli (e.g., a tone) 
that co-occur with a response (e.g., fear evoked by a shock) will be associated with that 
response and will therefore be able to evoke the response on subsequent encounters (e.g., 
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Thorndike, 1911). Importantly, the formation of S-R associations is typically thought of as a 
relatively unconditional consequence of the co-occurrence of stimuli and responses. Note that 
when a CS and US co-occur, the only function of the US is to evoke a response that is then 
associated with the CS. Nothing is learned about the US as such. 
 Although S-R association models have now been largely abandoned by conditioning 
researchers because of their inability to account for key findings (see Bouton, 2016, De 
Houwer & Hughes, in press, and Rescorla, 1988, for reviews), they were dominant at the time 
when behavior therapy emerged (see Eelen, 2018, for a review) and continued to influence 
thinking about psychopathology later on (e.g., Carter & Barlow, 1995). S-R association 
models can indeed account for the fact that stimulus pairings are a possible cause of anxiety 
disorders (e.g., Mowrer, 1939). If an originally neutral stimulus (e.g., a spider) co-occurs with 
an aversive event (e.g., a painful bite from the spider) that evokes an emotional response, this 
results in the formation of an association between the neutral stimulus and the emotional 
response. Subsequent presentations of the neutral stimulus will thus lead to the emotional 
response. S-R association models are in line with the results of naturalistic and retrospective 
studies which show a positive relation between anxiety disorders and traumatic events. 
Stimuli encountered during the traumatic events would become associated with the negative 
emotional responses that typically arise in those events. As a result, the stimuli will evoke 
these negative emotional responses when presented after the traumatic event. 
 S-R association models cannot explain by themselves the occurrence of anxiety 
disorders in the absence of aversive stimulus pairings (i.e., that pairings are not a necessary 
condition). A stimulus and an emotional response need to co-occur in space and time in order 
for both to become associated. Hence, the only way for stimuli to acquire fear-provoking 
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properties is to co-occur with fear responses during a traumatic event. Any instance of anxiety 
disorders in the apparent absence of a traumatic event falls beyond the scope of S-R 
association models and raises doubts about the importance of S-R association formation as a 
mechanism underlying anxiety disorders. At the very least, one has to assume that it is not the 
only effective mechanism (see below for the section on multiple-mechanism accounts). 
 It is also difficult to reconcile S-R association models with the fact that anxiety 
disorders can result from instructions and observation. One might argue that instructions (e.g., 
“this animal is dangerous”) and observations (e.g., of someone showing a fearful expression 
in the presence of an animal) evoke emotional responses that are associated with certain 
stimuli (e.g., the sight or name of a particular animal). However, because only the co-
occurrence of stimuli and responses matters for the formation of S-R associations, the effect 
of instructions and observation should depend only on which stimuli and responses occur 
rather than on how those stimuli and responses are related. For instance, if an observed model 
shows a fearful response in the presence of a novel animal, this should result in associations 
between the animal and the model’s fear response regardless of whether model has actually 
seen the animal (and thus whether the expression could provide information about the 
properties of the animal). Both common sense and empirical evidence (e.g., Baeyens, 
Vansteenwegen, De Houwer, & Crombez, 1996) suggests that the effect of observations does 
depend on cues about the way in which observed events and responses are related. Likewise, 
the instruction “you are in danger because of this animal” is likely to have an entirely 
different effect than the instruction “you are in danger but not because of this animal”. In both 
cases, the word “animal” co-occurs with a fearful response but only the first instruction is 
likely to install fear for the animal. Although particular instantiations of S-R models might be 
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able to explain the fact that not all instructions or observations are equally potent in installing 
fears, it seems unlikely that S-R models can fully capture the effect of instructions and 
observations on the development of fear and anxiety. 
  Research also showed that stimulus pairings are not always a sufficient cause of 
anxiety disorders (see Rachman, 1977). The fact that pairings involving a traumatic event do 
not always lead to anxiety disorders, clearly contradicts the old idea that the co-occurrence of 
stimuli and negative emotional responses always leads to formation of S-R associations and 
that these associations always lead to anxiety disorders (Wolpe & Rachman, 1960). One 
could of course develop more sophisticated S-R association formation models that 
incorporate assumptions about the conditions under which S-R associations are formed or 
altered and the conditions under which those associations influence behavior (see McAllister 
& McAllister, 1991, for a discussion). The value of these more sophisticated S-R association 
formation models depends on how well they are able to account for the known moderators of 
anxiety disorders (i.e., heuristic function) and to predict new, previously unseen moderating 
effects (i.e., predictive function; De Houwer, 2011). Although it is beyond the scope of the 
present paper to provide a comprehensive review of the successes and failures of S-R 
association formation models (see Dickinson, 1980, and McAllister & McAllister, 1991, for 
reviews), there is large consensus in the literature that the heuristic and predictive function of 
these models is limited.  
 In sum, S-R association formation models can be evaluated by examining whether 
they can account for the way in which stimulus pairings produce anxiety disorders. Although 
they can account for the fact that stimulus pairings are a possible cause of anxiety disorders, 
they have problems dealing with the fact that stimulus pairings are neither a necessary nor a 
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sufficient cause of anxiety disorders. Hence, there seems to be little value in assuming that 
anxiety disorders are typically mediated by such a mechanism.  
 S-S association formation models. According to S-S association formation models, 
the pairing of stimuli (e.g., tone and shock) results in the formation of an association between 
the representations of those stimuli in memory. Once a CS representation (e.g., of the tone) 
has become associated with a US representation (e.g., of the shock), the presentation of the 
CS can activate the representation of the US, which in turn results in anticipatory responses 
(e.g., fear of the painful shock; but see Jozefowiez, 2018). Different S-S association 
formation models differ in their assumptions about when stimulus pairings lead to S-S 
associations and when S-S associations influence behavior (see Figure 1; for reviews, see 
Bouton, 2016; Pearce & Bouton, 2001).  
 Traumatic events could lead to anxiety disorders because they involve the pairing of 
initially neutral stimuli (CSs) and highly aversive stimuli (USs). This results in the formation 
of associations between the neutral and aversive stimuli, thus allowing the neutral stimuli to 
afterwards activate representations of the USs and the negative emotional responses that are 
part of or linked to those representations. S-S association formation models can thus explain 
why naturalistic and retrospective studies reveal a correlation between traumatic events and 
anxiety disorders.  
 Although S-S association formation models postulate that the pairing of a neutral and 
aversive event are a possible cause of anxiety disorders, such aversive stimulus pairings are 
not assumed to be a necessary cause of anxiety disorders. Even the pairing of neutral stimuli 
(CS1-CS2) can eventually lead to anxiety disorders, for instance, when the second of those 
neutral stimuli is subsequently paired with an aversive US (CS2-US). In this case, the initial 
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pairings result in an association between the first and the second stimulus representation 
whereas the subsequent pairings create an association between the second stimulus 
representation and the US. Because of these representations, activation of the representation 
of the first stimulus (CS1) can spread to the representation of the second stimulus (CS2) and 
subsequently to the representation of the US. S-S association formation models can thus 
account for phenomena like sensory pre-conditioning. This broadens their explanatory power 
to those instances of anxiety disorders in which the feared object did not appear to have been 
paired with aversive events. For instance, a child that first sees spiders in the garden and 
afterwards is bitten by a spider at school, might start fearing and avoiding gardens. It also 
points at new ways of treating disorders, for instance, by devaluing the threat value of the US 
that is thought to underlie the disorder (e.g., reducing fear for a spider bite to reduce fear of 
going in the garden; see Davey, 1997, for an insightful discussion).  
 Evidence for the hereditary nature of anxiety disorders can be accommodated by S-S 
association formation models that postulate selectivity in the formation of S-S associations. 
Note that neither S-R nor S-S association formation models inherently predict (genetically 
determined) selectivity in the formation of associations. Nevertheless, whereas the formation 
of S-R associations is sometimes thought to be an unconditional consequence of stimulus-
response co-occurrences, proponents of S-S association formation models typically 
acknowledge the fact that not all stimulus pairings are equally potent in creating associations 
(e.g., Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006; Öhman & Mineka, 2001).  
S-S and S-R association formation models face similar limitations in the way they 
account for the effects of instructions and observation. Most crucially, they struggle with the 
fact that the effects of instructions depend on the symbolic meaning of the whole sentence 
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rather than merely on the spatio-temporal co-occurrence of words. S-S associations are very 
limited in their capacity to code symbolic meaning, more specifically the way that stimuli are 
related (Lagnado, Waldmann, Hagmayer, & Sloman, 2007; Mitchell, De Houwer, & 
Lovibond, 2009). For instance, instructions such as “the animal causes pain” and “the animal 
has pain” should lead to the same animal-pain association and thus the same changes in 
behavior. Although I do not exclude the possibility that S-S association formation models 
will be able to deal with this issue in the future, existing S-S models do not seem to provide a 
full account of the effect of instructions and observation on anxiety disorders (see De 
Houwer, 2009, 2018).  
 S-S association formation models are, however, compatible with the observation that 
stimulus pairings with aversive events do not always result in anxiety disorders. Most models 
incorporate explicit assumptions about the variables that moderate the effect of stimulus 
pairings. In fact, most of the research on classical conditioning during the past 40 years has 
been directed at testing the predictions of different S-S models about the variables that 
moderate classical conditioning effects (e.g., see Bouton, 2016, De Houwer & Hughes, in 
press, and Rescorla, 1988, for reviews). Many of the moderators that were identified in this 
research also seem to influence anxiety disorders. Others have reviewed these successes of S-
S association formation models in detail (see Craske et al., 2006, 2018; Field, 2006; Mineka 
& Oehlberg, 2008; Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006). For instance, S-S based models have helped to 
shed new light on the conditions under which extinction and exposure treatments result in a 
reduction of fear (e.g., Bouton, 1993, and Craske et al., 2006, 2018, for reviews).  
Note that different S-S models differ in their heuristic and predictive value, that is, in 
their ability to account for and predict the effect of moderators of classical conditioning and 
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anxiety disorders. For instance, the well-known Rescorla-Wagner model (Rescorla & 
Wagner, 1972) is unable to explain relapse after successful exposure treatment. Other S-S 
models, however, can account for this important observation and inform us about the 
conditions under which relapse might be prevented. These more recent models postulate that 
extinction and exposure effects are due to (context dependent) additional learning rather than 
forgetting. Hence, extinction and exposure effects could be made less context dependent and 
more long lasting by making this additional learning stronger and less context dependent 
(e.g., Bouton, 1993; Craske et al., 2018). 
 In sum, S-S association models are quite specific about the way in which stimulus 
pairings might produce anxiety disorders. At least some of their predictions seems to be in 
line with the available evidence. As noted by a reviewer, however, some arguments in support 
of S-S association models of anxiety disorders (e.g., the idea that multiple stimulus pairings 
could jointly produce anxiety disorders) are based primarily on speculation rather than actual 
data. Moreover, S-S models do not fit well with evidence showing that anxiety disorders can 
result from and be affected by verbal instructions and the observation of others. 
 Propositional models. Propositional models are built on the assumption that classical 
conditioning is mediated by the formation of propositional beliefs about the relation between 
stimuli (e.g., De Houwer, 2009, 2018; Mitchell et al., 2009). In other words, the pairing of 
two stimuli (e.g., tone and shock) can lead to a change in an individual’s behavior only after 
this individual formed the belief that the two stimuli are related in a certain way (e.g., the 
belief that the tone predicts the shock). Unlike S-S associations, propositions contain 
information not only about the fact that stimuli are related but also about how those stimuli 
are related. This has the important implication that identical stimulus pairings (e.g., the 
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observation that patients with a certain disease also have a certain chemical substance in their 
blood) can lead to different propositions (e.g., “the disease causes the substance” or “the 
disease is caused by the substance”) that influence behavior in different ways (e.g., whether 
one tries to remove the substance in order to cure the disease; see Lagnado et al., 2007, for an 
insightful discussion of the difference between associations and propositions). Whereas the 
effects of propositions on behavior can be automatic (e.g., it is difficult to stay calm when one 
believes that wild tiger is nearby), the formation of propositions is thought to be a largely 
non-automatic process that has much in common with problem-solving (see De Houwer, 
2018, for more details). This implies that stimulus pairings influence behavior only when the 
individual has sufficient time and cognitive resources to form a conscious proposition about 
these pairings. Although propositional models differ in important ways from S-S and 
especially S-R association models, they are in line with many important findings in classical 
conditioning research (see De Houwer, 2009, and Mitchell et al., 2009, for reviews). For 
instance, the fact that classical conditioning is rarely if ever observed in the absence of 
awareness of the CS-US relation strongly supports the idea that conditioning is mediated by 
the formation of conscious propositions (see Mertens & Engelhard, in press, for a recent 
review). 
Could the impact of stimulus pairings on anxiety disorders also be mediated by the 
formation of propositions (see Lovibond, 2011, for a more extensive discussion of the 
implications of propositional models for understanding and treating anxiety disorders)? 
Propositional models can certainly deal with the fact that stimulus pairings are a possible 
source of anxiety disorders. The co-occurrence of a neutral and a negative stimuli (e.g., the 
pain caused by a spider that bites you) can lead to negative beliefs about the originally neutral 
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stimulus (e.g., “spiders can cause a painful bite”) and thus to fear of that stimulus. Once a 
belief about the relation between stimuli has been formed, it can lead to all kinds of new 
related beliefs (e.g., “spiders are dangerous”). As such, propositional models are in line with 
the observation that anxiety disorders are often if not always accompanied by negative beliefs 
about the feared object. These beliefs can be irrational if they are based on a biased sampling 
of events (e.g., being exposed mainly to spiders that have painful bites rather than benign 
spiders) or a biased weighting of events in the world (e.g., more weight is given to one 
experience with a dangerous spider than to many experiences with benign spiders). Although 
people might not always remember the stimulus pairings that led to the formation of those 
propositional beliefs, at least in some cases patients should be able to retrospectively report 
those pairings. 
 The fact that anxiety disorders sometimes develop in the apparent absence of 
traumatic events can also be explained on the basis of propositional models. Once two neutral 
stimuli have co-occurred and a proposition has been formed about the relation between those 
neutral stimuli (e.g., “this frog has spots on its skin”), subsequent experiences (e.g., learning 
that amphibians with spotted skin tend to be poisonous) can dramatically alter the impact of 
those initial stimulus pairings on behavior (e.g., physical contact with the frog is now 
avoided). Hence, anxiety disorders could develop even when the feared object did not co-
occur with a negative event.  
 The importance of genetic factors in the development of anxiety disorders can be 
accommodated by propositional models. Although still mere speculation at this time, it is 
possible that genetic factors might contribute to the development of anxiety disorders by 
determining the probability that conscious propositional beliefs are formed as the result of 
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certain stimulus pairings. For instance, throughout the evolution of mankind, spiders have 
posed a bigger challenge for survival than squirrels. This could have predisposed humans to 
form negative beliefs about spiders. For instance, someone who experiences a panic attack in 
a park might be more inclined to causally attribute the panic to the spider they saw crawling 
over the grass than to the squirrel that just passed by. As a result, he or she would be more 
likely to develop a fear for spiders than a fear for squirrels. An impact of genetic factors could 
thus be mediated by the formation of propositional beliefs (see Testa, 1974, for a precursor to 
this idea).  
 The main strength of propositional models, however, is that they are perfectly in line 
with the fact that anxiety disorders can result from instructions and observations. Whereas S-
S and S-R associations can at best capture the co-occurrence of stimuli that part of the 
instructions or observation, propositions represent also the manner in which those stimuli are 
related and thus encode more fully the symbolic implications of instructions and observed 
events. Propositional models also clarify the relation between the effects of pairings, 
instructions, and observations. More specifically, actual pairings of stimuli are seen as one 
source for the formation of propositional beliefs about relations between stimuli. Those same 
beliefs can be formed also on the basis of the symbolic meaning of instructions about how 
stimuli or events are related or the observation of how others respond to stimuli. For instance, 
some people might believe that spiders are dangerous because they have once been bitten by a 
spider, others might have formed this belief because they saw someone else been bitten by a 
spider, and still others might have come to that belief because their parents told them that 
spiders can bite. Different sources of beliefs might differ in their effectiveness in producing 
beliefs (e.g., actual experiences might lead to more firm beliefs than observation or 
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instruction, e.g., Reiss, 1980) but all routes are fundamentally similar in that they can produce 
propositional beliefs that lead to anxiety. Note that this idea fits well with the observation that 
the moderators of conditioning effects are highly similar to those of the effects of 
conditioning instructions (Mertens et al., 2018). 
 Finally, propositional models also imply that stimulus pairings are not sufficient for 
the development of anxiety disorders. Because stimulus pairings affect behavior only after a 
proposition about the relation has been formed, conditioning should be moderated by 
variables that influence the formation of propositions. For instance, whether a stimulus 
pairing is noticed (i.e., a conscious proposition about the pairings is formed) depends on 
whether attention is directed to the stimuli. Likewise, the content of beliefs (i.e., assumptions 
about whether and how stimuli are related) is biased by preexisting beliefs and cues in the 
current environment that could disambiguate the nature of the relation between stimuli. Let us 
return to the example of someone who has a panic attack in a park. Whether the panic attack 
is causally attributed to the spider could depend on the knowledge about spiders that the 
person already possesses (e.g., the belief that spiders are a plausible cause of panic attacks 
because many other people are afraid of spiders).  
Although propositional models have not yet been formalized, they do provide 
inspiration for research on the moderators of anxiety disorders. For instance, relapse after 
treatment might occur when patients retrospectively reevaluate the beliefs they formed during 
treatment (e.g., that a spider did not hurt them during treatment because the therapist used a 
special kind of spider during therapy; see Raes, De Houwer, Verschuere, & De Raedt, 2011, 
for experimental evidence regarding this idea). Also, propositional models imply that there is 
no need for “treatment matching”, that is, an overlap between the type of experience that has 
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led to the anxiety disorder (e.g., the direct experience of stimulus pairings) and the type of 
experience that is used to treat the disorder (e.g., verbal instruction; see Lovibond, 2011). Of 
course, this does not imply that simply giving verbal information is sufficient to solve all 
anxiety disorders, even those that are based on stimulus pairings. The revision of beliefs is 
not only difficult to achieve but will be effective only if one changes those beliefs that 
actually underlie the feelings and behaviors one wishes to tackle. A propositional perspective 
on conditioning reveals that the pairing (or un-pairing) of stimuli is just one tool for belief 
revision, a tool that can be combined with other tools such as instructions and observation. 
Rather than assuming that conditioning is part of a separate realm that is driven by association 
formation, it can now be brought into the realm of belief revision. Nevertheless, conditioning 
research remains important for clinical psychology. Using conditioning procedures in the lab 
not only allows researchers to study an important route of belief formation but also to explore 
various ways of counteracting fear via belief revision. More specifically, once fear has been 
established via stimulus pairings, it can be examined how stimulus presentations (e.g., 
extinction procedures), instructions, and observations (jointly) alter fear. 
 In sum, also propositional models provide specific ideas about the role of stimulus 
pairings in anxiety disorders. Like S-S association formation models, they can account for the 
fact that stimulus pairings are possible but not a necessary or sufficient cause of anxiety 
disorders. However, they differ considerably from S-R and S-S association formation models 
in the way that they account for anxiety disorders that result from instructions and 
observation. They also fit well with the idea that beliefs play an important role in anxiety 
disorders. On the other hand, they are less formalized than most association formation 
models. Also, many of the arguments in favor of proposition formation as the mechanism via 
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which stimulus pairings produce anxiety disorders remain speculative. 4 
 Multiple mechanisms. At least in principle, multiple conditioning mechanisms could 
contribute to the development of anxiety disorders. For instance, some anxiety disorders 
might be mediated by S-R association formation whereas others are the result of S-S 
association formation and still other are produced by propositional processes. Such dual- or 
multiple-mechanisms views are currently popular both in conditioning research (e.g., 
McLaren et al., 2014) and psychology in general (but see Keren & Schul, 2009, Melnikoff & 
Bargh, 2018, and Moors & De Houwer, 2006, for critical discussions). 
 The heuristic value of a multiple-mechanism view is high because it combines the 
explanatory power of each of the individual mechanisms. Whenever a particular empirical 
finding fits well with the operation of one but not another mechanism, one can argue that the 
observed effect is due the former but not the latter mechanism. For instance, the fact that 
anxiety disorders can result from instructions in the absence of traumatic events can be 
attributed to the operation of propositional processes whereas anxiety disorders that are 
resistant to the impact of instructions could be seen as the result of S-R association formation. 
Although the increased heuristic value of a multiple-mechanism view is appealing, its 
predictive value is low when there are no constraints on the way different mechanisms 
interact. Without knowledge about these constraints, it is impossible to predict when a first 
rather than a second or third mechanism will operate. At present, little is known about these 
                                                 
4 Some of the implications of propositional models for our understanding of anxiety disorders are reminiscent of 
the ideas put forward by Davey (1997) and Field (2006). Like proponents of propositional models, Davey and 
Field pointed at the importance of conscious beliefs in both conditioning and anxiety disorders, more specifically 
the role of conscious expectancies. They also allowed for the possibility that conditioning result from 
observation and instruction. Nevertheless, Davey (1997) and Field (2006) remained committed to the view that 
conditioning effects and anxiety disorders are mediated by the formation of S-S associations. As discussed 
earlier, it is difficult to see how models based on S-S associations can capture the full impact of conscious 
beliefs, instructions, and observation on behavior (see De Houwer, 2009, 2018; Jozefowiez, 2018). 
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constraints (Mitchell et al., 2009). Moreover, testing ideas about these constraints is likely to 
be challenging. As I noted earlier in this paper, even the hypothesis that conditioning is due to 
one particular mechanism can be evaluated only indirectly by examining the moderators of 
conditioning. Studying the way in which two or more conditioning mechanisms interact is 
even more challenging in that it can be achieved only by examining interactions between 
multiple moderators. Consider the most straightforward (but unlikely) case in which there is 
general agreement about the fact that the (lack of) impact of one moderator is diagnostic of 
the operation of one particular conditioning mechanism (e.g., the absence of US-revaluation 
as an indicator of S-R association formation). Studying the constraints of this mechanism 
requires knowledge about the variables that determine the impact of the diagnostic moderator, 
that is, the moderator which is assumed to be diagnostic of a particular conditioning 
mechanism (e.g., the conditions under which US-revaluation occurs; see Bouton, 2016). The 
more complex the ideas about how different mechanisms interact, the more difficult it 
becomes to test these ideas. But if researchers wish to move beyond the mere illusionary 
benefits of unconstrained multiple-mechanism models, they need to engage in this type of 
meta-conditional research that focuses on interactions between moderators (De Houwer, 
2007).   
Are Anxiety Disorders Best Conceived of as Conditioning Effects or Products of a 
Conditioning Mechanism? 
 The previous section highlights an important reason for distinguishing between 
different claims about the relation between conditioning and anxiety disorders: evidence 
against one particular claim (e.g., anxiety disorders as products of S-R association formation) 
should not be interpreted as evidence against another claim or against the conditioning 
 Conditioning and Anxiety Disorders 
 
33 
approach tout-court. This section focusses on another reason for distinguishing different 
claims: thinking about anxiety disorders in terms of conditioning effects versus conditioning 
mechanisms has important implications for the viability of the conditioning approach to 
anxiety disorders. First, a focus on conditioning effects improves the cumulative nature of 
research. Theories about conditioning mechanisms have changed in the past and will probably 
continue to change in the years to come. When conditioning is conceptualized in terms of one 
specific mechanism, evidence against that mechanism can threaten conditioning research as a 
whole. This point is clearly illustrated by how evidence against S-R association formation 
models in humans has been interpreted by many as problematic for the conditioning approach 
as a whole (e.g., Brewer, 1974; see Eelen, 2018). If conditioning is equated with the 
formation of S-R associations, and if S-R association formation does not occur in human, it 
no longer makes sense to conduct conditioning research in humans or to conceptualize 
anxiety disorders in terms of conditioning.  
On the other hand, when conditioning is defined as an effect, functional knowledge 
about moderators can be framed independently from theories about the mechanisms that 
mediate these effects. For instance, the fact that an extinction procedure leads to a reduction 
in conditioned fear is an important piece of knowledge regardless of which mechanism 
mediates (the extinction of) conditioning effects. This does not mean that theories about 
mechanisms should simply be ignored. On the contrary, mechanistic theories can be 
instrumental in the discovery of new important functional knowledge and knowledge about 
mechanisms can have value as such (see De Houwer, 2011, and Hughes et al., 2016, for a 
detailed discussion of the mutually supportive nature of functional and mechanistic 
approaches in psychology). For instance, the influential work of Bouton (1993) on the 
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context-dependency of extinction effects has greatly increased our knowledge of the 
moderators of the extinction effect (see Craske et al., 2018, for a review). Although this work 
was for a large part inspired by S-S association formation theories, the insight that extinction 
effects depend on changes in context remains highly valuable even if those S-S associations 
formation theories would at some point in time have to be abandoned. Therefore, conceiving 
of anxiety disorders as conditioning effects allows for a constant development of our 
understanding of conditioning and anxiety disorders even when ideas about conditioning 
mechanisms change over time. Changes in ideas about the mechanisms that mediate classical 
conditioning should not be considered as a threat for a functional conditioning approach. On 
the contrary, these changes can offer new perspectives on the moderators of conditioning 
effects and thus new inspiration for discovering the moderators of anxiety disorders. 
A second advantage of thinking about anxiety disorders as conditioning effects is that 
it allows one to appreciate more fully the value of conditioning research for various types of 
therapies. Hayes (2004) proposed a distinction between three types or waves of behavior 
therapy. First wave therapies resulted directly from conditioning research but were 
conceptualized primarily in terms of the formation and change of S-R associations (e.g., 
Wolpe & Rachman, 1960). Second wave therapies were also conceptualized in a mechanistic 
manner but focused on the correction of cognitive mechanisms (i.e., pathological mental 
representations or processes; e.g., Beck, 1975; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Third wave 
therapies do not focus primarily on correcting mechanisms but on the context and functions 
of psychological phenomena (e.g., Hayes, 2004).  
When anxiety disorders are conceptualized as conditioning effects, conditioning 
research can be seen as a source of information about which variables in the environment 
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produce and modify anxiety disorders. From this perspective, conditioning research can 
continue to contribute to first wave therapies without a commitment to questionable S-R 
association formation models. For instance, S-S association formation inspired research on 
the context-dependency of extinction effects which promise to improve exposure therapies 
(e.g., exposure in multiple contexts; see Craske et al., 2018, for an overview). Such changes 
in therapies can be implemented without making assumptions about the mechanisms that 
mediate these improvements.  
By revealing the moderators of conditioning, conditioning research can also contribute 
to second wave therapies. Based on the idea that anxiety disorders are conditioning effects, 
functional knowledge concerning the moderators of conditioning provides the input for 
theories about the cognitive mechanisms that mediate anxiety disorders and other 
conditioning effects. Mechanistic models such as cognitive theories can be evaluated on the 
basis of how well they are able to explain existing empirical knowledge and lead to the 
discovery of new empirical knowledge. Therefore, the more we know about the variables that 
moderate the effects of stimulus pairings, the better able we are to evaluate and improve 
cognitive theories about the processes and representations that mediate anxiety disorders and 
other conditioning effects. For instance, the work of Bouton (1993) and Craske et al. (2018) 
suggests that context-dependent associations or beliefs mediate anxiety disorders. 
Conditioning research can not only help to identify these mediating cognitive structures but 
also to understand their environmental origins and to find ways of changing them.  
Finally, the idea that anxiety disorders are conditioning effects also fits well with the 
non-mechanistic nature of certain third wave therapies like ACT. In fact, many therapeutic 
techniques that are used in third wave therapies (e.g., reinforcing efforts to not control 
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anxiety) could be seen as potential moderators of the effect of stimulus pairings on anxiety 
disorders and could thus be studied also in conditioning research (e.g., Treanor, 2011, for an 
overview of how mindfulness can moderate effects of exposure). Because conditioning is 
often conceived of in terms of a specific mechanism, this potential of conditioning research 
for third wave therapies still remains to be recognized and explored.   
Conclusion 
During the second half of the previous century, conditioning research was the main 
source of inspiration for ideas about the origins and treatment of anxiety disorders. Since the 
1980’s, however, the impact of the conditioning research on clinical psychology has waned. 
This decline can in part be attributed to a number of influential papers that questioned the 
relevance of conditioning research for anxiety disorders (Poulton & Menzies, 2002; 
Rachman, 1977) as well as the rise of a variety of therapies that are typically not seen as part 
of the conditioning approach. The aim of this paper was to shed new light on the merits of the 
conditioning approach to anxiety disorders by clearly separating the different claims that can 
be made about the relation between conditioning and anxiety disorders and by indicating how 
these different claims can be evaluated. Although questions can be raised about certain claims 
(e.g., that anxiety disorders are due to the formation of S-R associations), this does not imply 
that other claims are without merit. When clearly separating the different claims that can be 
made, it becomes clear that conditioning research is likely to remain an important source of 
information about origins and treatment of anxiety disorders. 
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Figure 1. A schematic depiction of the three steps about which assumptions have to be made 
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Table 1. Overview of the empirical evidence regarding the claim that stimulus pairings involving negative events are a possible, necessary, and 
sufficient cause of anxiety disorders, including whether the evidence can be explained (YES), can be explained to some extent (YES BUT), or 
cannot be explained (NO) by different mechanistic accounts of conditioning. 
 
  Topic   Evidence         S-R Association Models      S-S Association Models   Propositional Models 
 
Stimulus Pairings are  
    A Possible Cause  - pairings can cause fears   YES    YES   YES  
   in controlled studies 
- retrospective reports of    YES    YES   YES  
pairings that cause fears 
  
    Not a Necessary Cause - fears in the absence of    NO    YES   YES 
aversive stimulus pairings  
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- genetic contribution to the    YES BUT   YES    YES 
development of fears 
- fears result from observation  YES BUT   YES BUT  YES 
    and instructions 
 
    Not Always a Sufficient - pairings with a traumatic event  YES BUT   YES   YES 
    Cause   sometimes do not result in fears 
    - the effect of pairings is modulated  YES BUT   YES   YES 
    by a host of variables 
